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For thousands of years, code-makers and code-breakers have been
competing for supremacy. Their arsenals may soon include a powerful
new weapon: quantum mechanics.
Cryptography— the art of code-making — has a long history of military and
diplomatic applications, dating back to the Babylonians. In World World Two,
the Allies’ feat of breaking the legendary German code, Enigma, contributed
greatly to the final Allied victory. Nowadays, cryptography is becoming increas-
ingly important in commercial applications for electronic business and electronic
commerce. Sensitive data such as credit card numbers and personal identifica-
tion numbers (PINs) are routinely transmitted in encrypted form. Quantum
mechanics is a new tool for both code-breakers and code-makers in their eternal
arms race. It has the potential to revolutionize cryptography both by creating
perfectly secure codes and by breaking standard encryption schemes.
The most well-known application of cryptography is secure communica-
tion [1]. Suppose Alice would like to send a message to Bob, but there is
an eavesdropper, Eve, who is wiretapping the channel. To prevent Eve from
knowing the message, Alice and Bob may perform encryption, i.e., transform
the message to something that is not intelligible to Eve during the communi-
cation. On receiving the message, Bob inverts the transformation and recovers
the message (see figure 1).
Bob’s advantage over Eve lies in his knowledge of a secret, commonly called
the key, that he shares with Alice. The key tells him how to decode the message.
For example:
The rumble of Soviet tanks shook the Prague hotel room (number 117) as
secret agent John Blond finished decoding his orders from his superior N.
He tore the used page from the codebook and immediately burned it with
his lighter.
Blond is using a perfectly unbreakable cipher, a “one-time pad.” The secret
codebook allows N and Blond to share a long secret binary string — the key —
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before Blond leaves on his mission. Whenever N would like to send a message to
Blond, she first converts it to binary. She then takes the exclusive-OR (XOR)
between each bit of the message and the corresponding key bit to generate the
encrypted message, which is transmitted in a public channel. The KGB can
intercept the encrypted message, but without the key, it is incomprehensible
gibberish, offering no clue to the contents of the original message. On the other
hand, Blond, by looking up the key in the codebook, can recover the original
message by taking the XOR between the encrypted message and the key. Blond
immediately burns the used page of the codebook to prevent it from falling into
the hands of the KGB in the future.
1 Key Distribution Problem
John Blond finally snapped shut the codebook and sighed. He had been
on duty in Czechoslovakia for so long that his codebook was getting thin.
He knew his days in Prague would soon be over: N would have to recall
him before he used up his whole codebook. Blond recalled master cryp-
tographer R’s remonstration: “This is no joking matter, double-one seven.
Never re-use the one-time pad.”
R was serious for a good reason. The reuse of keys by the Soviet Union (due
to the manufacturer’s accidental duplication of one-time-pad pages) enabled US
cryptanalysts to unmask the atomic spy Klaus Fuchs in 1949 [2]. When the
key for a one-time pad is used more than once, enemy cryptanalysts have the
opportunity to look for patterns in the encrypted messages which might reveal
the key. Nevertheless, excellent cryptosystems (known as symmetric cryptosys-
tems) have been developed that reuse the key. The longer the key, the more
secure the system. For instance, a widely-used system is the Data Encryption
Standard (DES), which has a key length of 56 bits. No method substantially
more efficient than trying all 256 values of the key is known for breaking DES.
It is still conceivable, however, that some yet unknown clever algorithm could
defeat DES and its cousins.
For top secret applications, therefore, the one-time pad is preferable. Blond’s
predicament illustrates the drawback of the one-time pad: when the secret key
is used up, the code cannot be used until the sender and receiver get together to
share a new secret key. Sending a courier with a new codebook into the Prague
Spring is a dangerous and unreliable business. Even if the courier arrives, Blond
and N can never be sure that the codebook was not copied by the KGB during
its journey.
This issue is known as the “key distribution problem.” A possible solution is
public key cryptography. Instead of a single long key shared between the sender
and receiver, public key cryptography uses two sorts of keys: one public key,
which is known to the world, and one private key, known only to the receiver.
Anyone with the public key can send secret messages, but only someone who
knows the private key can read them. The important defining feature of public
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key cryptography is that, even knowing the encryption key, there is no known
computationally efficient way of working out what the decryption key really is.
As an example, the security of the most well-known public key crypto-system,
RSA, relies on the difficulty of factoring large integers (see figure 2).
Public key cryptography can be used for another important task: digital
signatures. A digital signature exchanges the role of the keys used in public key
cryptography: the private key is used to generate a signature, and the public
key is used to verify it. Only someone with the private key could have created
the signature.
2 Quantum Code-breaking
Both DES and RSA rely on an unproven assumption: there is no fast algorithm
to determine the secret key. For instance, RSA is believed to be secure be-
cause mathematicians throughout the world have worked very hard to break it,
steadily producing modest improvements in factoring algorithms, but without
groundbreaking success. By only modest increases in key size, users of RSA can
easily keep ahead even of the exponential growth in computing power over the
years.
Quantum mechanics changed this. In 1994, Peter Shor of AT&T invented
a quantum algorithm for efficient factoring of large numbers [3]. The state of a
quantum computer is a superposition of exponentially many basis states, which
correspond to the states of a classical computer of the same size. By taking ad-
vantage of interference and entanglement in this system, a quantum computer
can perform in a reasonable time some tasks that would take ridiculously long
on a classical computer. Shor’s discovery propelled the then obscure subject
of quantum computing into a dynamic and rapidly developing field, and stim-
ulated scores of experiments and proposals aimed towards building quantum
computers.
Another remarkable discovery was made by Lov Grover who in 1996 invented
a quantum searching algorithm [4]. To find one particular item amongN objects
requires checking O(N) items classically. With Grover’s algorithm, a quantum
computer need only look up items O
(√
N
)
times. It can be used to radically
speed up the exhaustive key search of DES (i.e., trying all 256 possibilities).
If a quantum computer is ever constructed in the future, much of conven-
tional cryptography will fall apart! The key lengths of symmetric schemes like
DES would have to be doubled due to Grover’s algorithm. The most commonly-
used public key schemes are RSA and classes based on discrete logarithms or
elliptic curves; Shor’s algorithm breaks all of them. Even if it is decades until a
sufficiently large quantum computer can be built, this is a matter of current con-
cern: some data, such as nuclear weapons designs, must still remain secret then,
and it is important that today’s secret messages cannot be decoded tomorrow.
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3 Quantum Code-making
Even if DES and RSA do fall apart, the one-time pad remains a perfectly un-
breakable cipher even against a quantum computer. However, as discussed
above, it has a serious catch — the key distribution problem: It presupposes
that Alice and Bob share a key that is secret and as long as the message. There
is no way to guarantee that in practice. Trusted couriers can be bribed or even
intercepted without their knowledge. More generally, classical signals are dis-
tinguishable — an eavesdropper can reliably read the signals without changing
them. Therefore, in classical physics there is nothing, in principle, to prevent
an eavesdropper from wiretapping the key distribution channel passively.
Fortunately, quantum mechanics helps to make codes as well as break them.
(See [5] and C. H. Bennett, “Quantum Information and Computation,” Physics
Today, Oct. 1995, p. 24.) The Heisenberg uncertainty principle dictates that
it is fundamentally impossible to know the exact values of conjugate variables
such as the momentum of a particle and its position. This apparent limita-
tion imposed by quantum mechanics can be used as a powerful tool in catching
eavesdroppers. The key idea is to use non-orthogonal quantum states to en-
code information. More concretely, the essence of quantum cryptography can
be understood in a single question: given a single photon in one of four pos-
sible polarizations (vertical, horizontal, 45-degrees and 135-degrees), can one
determine its polarization with certainty? Surprisingly, the answer is no. The
rectilinear basis (the vertical and horizontal directions) is conjugate to the di-
agonal basis (at 45 and 135 degrees), so the Heisenberg uncertainty principle
forbids us from simultaneously measuring both. More generally, experiments
distinguishing non-orthogonal states, even if only partially reliable, will disturb
the states.
The key distribution problem can be partially solved by quantum mechanics
using the idea of quantum key distribution (QKD). The first and best-known
protocol is usually called “BB84” because it was published in 1984 by Charles
Bennett and Gilles Brassard [6]. (See box 1 for details.) In a prototypical
quantum key distribution protocol, Alice sends some nonorthogonal quantum
states to Bob, who makes some measurements. Then, by talking on the phone
(which need not be secure), they decide if Eve has tampered with the quantum
states. If not, they have a shared key, which is guaranteed to be secret. Note
that Alice and Bob must share some authentication information to begin with:
otherwise, Bob has no way to know that he is really talking to Alice on the
phone, and not a clever mimic. The key generated by QKD can subsequently
be used for both encryption and authentication, thus achieving two major goals
in cryptography.
4 Experimental quantum key distribution
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is an active experimental subject. The first
working experimental prototype was constructed in 1989 at IBM, Yorktown
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Box 1: BB84
In the most well-known quantum key distribution scheme, BB84, Alice sends
Bob a sequence of photons, each independently prepared in one of four polar-
izations (horizontal, vertical, 45 degrees, or 135 degrees). For each photon, Bob
randomly picks one of the two (rectilinear and diagonal) bases to perform a
measurement. He keeps the measurement outcome secret. Now Alice and Bob
publicly compare their bases. They keep only the polarization data for which
they measured in the same basis. In the absence of errors and Eve, these data
should agree. (They throw away the data for which their bases disagree.)
To test for tampering, they now choose a random subset of the remaining
polarization data and publicly announce them. From there they can compute
the error rate (i.e., the fraction of points where their values disagree). If the
error rate is unreasonably high, above around say 10%, they throw away all the
data (and perhaps try again later). If the error rate is acceptably small, they
perform error correction and also “privacy amplification” to distill out a shorter
string which will act as the secret key. These steps essentially ensure that their
keys agree, are random, and are unknown to Eve.
Other quantum key distribution schemes have also been proposed. For ex-
ample, Artur Ekert (of Oxford) proposed one based on quantum mechanically
correlated (i.e., entangled) photons and using Bell inequalities as a check of
security. In 1992, Charles Bennett of IBM proposed a simple quantum key
distribution scheme (called B92) which uses only two non-orthogonal states.
Heights [7]. It transmitted quantum signals over 32 cm of free air. Since then,
various groups including those led by Paul Townsend of BT, Jim Franson of
John Hopkins University, Nicolas Gisin and Hugo Zbinden of the University of
Geneva, and Richard Hughes of Los Alamos National Labs have made important
contributions. A primary focus has been a series of impressive experiments over
commercial optical fibers. The world record distance for QKD, at the time of
writing, is about 50km [8]. One of the long distance experiment was performed
by Los Alamos National Laboratories and is depicted in figure 3.
Most experiments to date have used variants of either the BB84 or B92
schemes (see box 1), although recently three groups — one led by Paul Kwiat
of Los Alamos, Gisin and Zbinden’s group at Geneva, and a collaboration led
by Anton Zeilinger of the University of Vienna and Harald Weinfurtur of the
University of Munich — have independently implemented EPR-based protocols.
In the BB84 and B92 schemes, typically a single-photon source is simulated
using attenuated coherent states — on average, only a fraction of a photon is
actually sent. When taken in conjunction with absorption in the fiber, only a
small fraction of arriving laser pulses actually contain a photon. This does not
interfere much with key distribution, since only the photons that reach Bob are
used in the protocol. The key is generally encoded in either the polarization
or the phase of the photon. Error rates in the photons actually received are
usually a few percent.
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For commercial applications in say a local area network environment, it
is useful for a quantum cryptographic system to be integrated into a passive
multi-user optical fiber network and its equipment to be miniaturized. Paul
Townsend’s group at BT (now of Corning) has done much work in this area [9].
As for point-to-point applications, the Geneva group has devised a so-called
“plug and play” system which automatically compensates for polarization fluc-
tuations [10]. Such systems might someday convey secret information between
government agencies around Washington D.C., or connect bank branches within
a city.
Quantum key distribution has also been performed in open air, during day-
light, with a current range of about 1.6 km [11]. An even more ambitious
proposal to perform a ground to satellite quantum key distribution experiment
has been made by John Hopkins University and, more recently and in more
detail, by Los Alamos National Laboratories. If successful, quantum cryptog-
raphy may be used to ensure the security of command control of satellites from
control centers on the ground.
Future experiments will aim to make quantum key distribution more reli-
able, to integrate it with today’s communications infrastructure, and to increase
the distance and rate of key generation. Another ambitious goal would be to
produce a quantum repeater using techniques of quantum error correction. Such
an accomplishment will require substantial technical breakthroughs, but would
allow key distribution over arbitrarily long distances.
5 Is QKD Secure?
While experiments in quantum key distribution forged ahead, the theory devel-
oped more slowly. A clever Eve can adopt many possible strategies to fool Alice
and Bob, including subtle quantum attacks entangling all of the particles sent
by Alice. Taking all possibilities into account, as well as the effects of realistic
imperfections in Alice and Bob’s apparatus and channel, has been very difficult.
A long series of partial results by many people has appeared over the years, ad-
dressing restricted sets of strategies by Eve [12], but only in the past few years
have complete proofs appeared.
One class of proofs, by Dominic Mayers [13] and subsequently others [14] at-
tack the problem directly, and prove the security of the standard BB84 protocol.
Another approach, by one of us (HKL) and H. F. Chau [15], instead proves the
security of a new protocol using quantum error-correcting codes [5]. (For infor-
mation on quantum error correction, see J. Preskill, “Battling Decoherence: The
Fault-Tolerant Quantum Computer”, Physics Today, June 1999, p. 24.) This
approach allows one to apply classical probability theory to tackle a quantum
problem directly. It works because the relevant observables under consideration
all commute with each other. While conceptually simpler, this protocol requires
a quantum computer to implement. The two classes of approaches have been
unified by Peter Shor and John Preskill [16], who showed that a quantum code
protocol could be modified to become BB84 without compromising its security.
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The proof of the security of QKD is a fine theoretical result, but it does not
mean that a real QKD system would be secure [17]. Some known and unknown
security loopholes might prove to be fatal. Apparently minor quirks of a system
can sometimes provide a lever for an eavesdropper to break it. For instance,
instead of producing a single photon, the laser may produce two; Eve can keep
one and give the other to Bob. She can then learn what polarization Alice
sent without revealing her presence. There are various possible solutions to
this particular problem; it is the unanticipated flaws that present the greatest
security hazard. Ultimately, we cannot have confidence that a real-life quantum
cryptographic system is secure until it has stood up to attacks from determined
real-life adversaries. Traditionally, breaking cryptographic protocols has been
regarded as important as making them — the protocols that survive are more
likely to be truly secure. The same standard will have to be applied to quantum
key distribution.
6 Post-Cold-War Applications
There are many problems beyond secure communication that can be addressed
by cryptography.
Alice and Bob are considering going on a date, but neither is willing to
admit their interest unless the other is also interested. How can they decide
whether or not to date without letting slip any unnecessary information?
This dating problem can be phrased as the problem of computing a function
f(a, b) = ab, where a and b are single bits held by Alice and Bob (0 = not
interested, 1 = interested). Problems like this can be solved classically using
variants of public key cryptography, which we know might be rendered insecure
by quantum computers. By exchanging quantum states, can Alice and Bob
solve the above dating problem with absolute security?
There are many possible functions f that two people might wish to compute
together, too many to address all of them individually. Instead, cryptographers
rely on a suite of primitive operations that can be composed to build more
complex functions. One important protocol is called bit commitment, and it is
the electronic equivalent of a locked box: Alice chooses a bit, 0 or 1, and writes
it on a piece of paper, which she deposits in the box. She gives the box to Bob,
but keeps the key. She cannot change what she wrote, and without the key,
Bob cannot open the box, but at some later point, Alice can give Bob the key
and reveal her bit. By itself, bit commitment is useful mostly for debunking
professional psychics, but it serves as a useful building block for more interesting
functions.
Consider the following bit commitment scheme proposed by Bennett and
Brassard [6]: if Alice wishes to commit to a 0, she sends Bob a polarized photon
in the rectilinear basis; if she wishes to commit to a 1, she sends Bob a polarized
photon in the diagonal basis. In either case, Alice flips a coin to decide which of
the two polarizations to send. Bob has no way to tell which basis Alice used —
either way, his state is perfectly random. When Alice unveils her bit, she tells
Bob which of the four states she used. Then Bob can measure in the appropriate
basis to verify that Alice is telling the truth. If she lies about which basis she
used, Bob has a 50% chance of finding out. If the protocol is repeated many
times, Alice’s chance of successfully cheating is abysmally small.
This protocol is secure against a classical cheater, who does not have much
ability to store and manipulate quantum states. But as Bennett and Brassard
recognized, a quantum cheater can break the protocol. Suppose, instead of
picking a specific state and sending it to Bob, Alice instead creates an entangled
pair of photons, (|HV 〉 − |V H〉)/√2 (this is also called an Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen, or EPR, pair), and sends the second photon to Bob, keeping the first
one. She stores the quantum state of the first photon and delays measuring
it. Suppose that when the time comes for Alice to open the commitment, she
decides she would like the committed bit to read 0, which requires her to specify
a state in the rectilinear basis. Alice knows that if she and Bob measure in the
same basis, they will get opposite results. Therefore, she can measure her photon
in the rectilinear basis and tell Bob he has the opposite polarization, and she
will always be right.
If Alice instead wishes the committed bit to read 1, she needs a state in the
diagonal basis. But
(|HV 〉 − |V H〉)/
√
2 = (|45◦, 135◦〉 − |135◦, 45◦〉/
√
2 (1)
She measures her particle in the diagonal basis, and can again be sure that
Bob’s measurement outcome will be opposite to hers. Quantum cheating allows
Alice to change her mind at the last minute without being caught by Bob, thus
totally defeating the purpose of bit commitment.
Nonetheless, more sophisticated schemes for quantum bit commitment were
proposed, and for a long time were believed to be secure. Eventually, the bubble
burst and it was shown that the quantum cheating strategy discussed above —
which uses the EPR effect and delayed measurements — can be generalized
to break all two-party quantum bit commitment schemes [18]: If Alice and
Bob hold one of two pure quantum states which are indistinguishable to Bob,
then Alice, acting unilaterally, can change one to the other. Therefore, the two
basic requirements of bit commitment — that Bob does not know the bit and
that Alice cannot change it — are fundamentally incompatible with quantum
mechanics.
The strength of the proof lies in its generality. The idea is to treat the whole
system as if it were quantum mechanical, extending the part that was originally
quantum to include any dice, measuring devices, and classical computation that
appear in the protocol. For this point of view, the original protocol is equivalent
to a purely quantum one, with some of the outputs being thrown in the trash
(see figure 4). Note that throwing something away can never help a cheater, so
we might as well assume that the state shared by Alice and Bob is completely
determined by the protocol — it is a pure quantum state, such as an EPR pair.
That substantially reduces the complexity of the problem; it is not difficult to
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Box 2: Glossary
B92 a quantum key distribution scheme using two nonorthogonal states.
BB84 a quantum key distribution scheme. See box 1.
cryptanalysis the art of code-breaking
cryptography the art of code-making
Data Encryption Standard (DES) a US federal standard symmetric en-
cryption scheme for unclassified but sensitive data.
key a random string of numbers employed in encryption or decryption
one-time pad a perfectly secure encryption scheme in which the key is as long
as the message and never re-used.
private key a decryption key that is kept secret.
public key an encryption key that is publicly announced.
public key cryptography see figure 2.
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) scheme see figure 2
quantum key distribution (QKD) a scheme based on quantum mechanics
that allows two users to share a common string of secret numbers.
symmetric cryptosystem a cryptographic system with the same private key
for both encryption and decryption.
show that when Alice and Bob hold a pure state, quantum bit commitment is
impossible.
Following the fall of quantum bit commitment, other important basic quan-
tum cryptographic protocols have also been proven to be insecure by one of us
(HKL), thus leaving the field in shambles. What is left? Some problems are too
similar to bit commitment, and cannot be done at all.
Other problems have more modest goals, and can be solved by quantum
protocols. For instance, Lior Goldenberg, Lev Vaidman, and Stephen Wiesner
of Tel Aviv University have proposed a method of “quantum gambling,” where a
cheater must pay a large fine whenever he is caught. The majority of problems
lie in a middle ground — we do not know whether or not they are possible.
The dating problem is an example. Many approaches to it tread too near bit
commitment, and are doomed to failure, but it’s possible there are others, as
yet undiscovered, which do not.
9
7 Physics Today, Cryptology Tomorrow
Quantum computers are still on the drawingboards, and quantum cryptography
systems are only prototypes. Still, there are a number of reasons for thinking
about quantum cryptology today. Unlike other cryptosystems, the security of
quantum key distribution is based on fundamental principles of quantum me-
chanics, rather than unproven computational assumptions. QKD eliminates the
great threat of unanticipated advances in algorithms and hardware breaking a
widely-used cryptosystem. Small-scale QKD systems are well within the capa-
bilities of today’s technology, and commercial systems could be available within
a few years (although whether such systems are widely adopted depends on
many non-academic factors such as cost. For further discussion, see H.-K. Lo,
quant-ph/9912011).
Furthermore, grappling with the problems posed by quantum protocols can
give us insight into more general questions about quantum mechanical systems
in many fields of physics. For instance, one reason it is hard to analyze pro-
tocols and attacks is that they frequently involve a combination of quantum
and classical behaviors. In considering bit commitment in the last section, it
was possible to replace classical parts of the protocol with a quantum descrip-
tion, an approach which is useful for many problems inside and outside the
field of quantum cryptography. It is sometimes called the Church of the Larger
Hilbert Space, following John Smolin of IBM — all quantum operations, includ-
ing measurements, are unitary when considered as acting on a larger Hilbert
space (figure 4).
Finally, quantum mechanics changes the world of cryptology, and it is im-
portant to know what the new terrain will look like in order to decide on cryp-
tographic standards that may last for decades. In a world where quantum com-
puters and communication are commonplace, today’s most widespread public
key cryptosystems would no longer work; in the worst case, perhaps no pub-
lic key cryptosystem will work. If so, symmetric cryptosystems and quantum
key distribution would partially fill the gap, allowing secure communication.
Unfortunately, digital signatures would fail as well, meaning important commu-
nications would need to be notarized by a trusted third party.
Of course, quantum key distribution and symmetric cryptosystems are not
useful in situations when Alice and Bob have never met before. Solving this
problem would probably require a quantum cryptographic center, which could
verify the identity of both of them. The center would have to be known and
trusted by both Alice and Bob.
Problems beyond secret communication and digital signatures are a mixed
bag. Many, such as bit commitment and perhaps the dating problem, would
be impossible, whereas others, such as quantum gambling, could be carried out
with complete security.
This is just one of a number of possible futures: perhaps some new or ex-
isting public key cryptosystems will survive quantum computation, or perhaps
there will be new public key systems that can only run on a quantum computer.
Perhaps quantum computers will always remain difficult to build (we believe
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Box 3: Decoding the message in Figure 1
The code is a “Caesar’s cipher,” where each letter is shifted by a fixed number
of places in the alphabet. In this case, the shift is three places.
Box 4: About the Authors
Daniel Gottesman is a postdoctoral fellow in the Theory Group of Microsoft
Research, Redmond, Washington. Hoi-Kwong Lo is Chief Scientist and Senior
Vice President, Research and Development of MagiQ Technologies, Inc., New
York, NY, http://www.magiqtech.com, a start-up company that focuses on the
commercial exploitation of quantum information technology.
that this is unlikely), and public key cryptography will remain widespread, de-
spite its potential flaws. Only time will tell who benefits more from quantum
cryptology: the code-makers or the code-breakers.
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Figure 1: Secure communication: a) Alice sends a message to Bob through
a communication channel, but an eavesdropper, Eve, is wiretapping. b) A
message is encrypted by Alice using an encryption key. The encrypted message,
the ciphertext, is now unintelligible to Eve. Bob, who has the same key as Alice,
can decrypt the ciphertext and recover the original message. (The code used in
this figure is not very secure. Try breaking it yourself; the solution is at the end
of the article.)
Figure 2: The RSA public key crypto-system: The most well-known public-key
system is called RSA, after its inventors Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard
Adleman. It is based on modular arithmetic over a large base N , which is the
product of two large primes p and q. If x is relatively prime to N , the Euler-
Fermat theorem tells us that xr ≡ 1 mod N , where r = (p−1)(q−1). The public
key is a pair of numbers (N, e), and the private key is d, with ed ≡ 1 mod r
(i.e., ed = kr + 1 for some integer k). To encrypt a message m, a sender Alice
computes y ≡ me mod N . To decrypt the message y, the receiver Bob computes
yd mod N ≡ med ≡ m. Note that, to do so, Bob has to know the private key d.
Anyone can send Bob an encrypted message, but only Bob can decrypt it.
Figure 3: Experimental quantum key distribution: a) Schematic of the 48 km
optical fiber quantum key distribution experiment at Los Alamos [8], which
implements the B92 two-state protocol. The laser with wavelength 1.3 µm is
first attenuated to approximate a single-photon source, which will ultimately
produce the key bits. The signal generated is then passed through Alice’s inter-
ferometer. The two nonorthogonal states of the B92 protocol are realized as two
possible settings for the phase delay, φA, in one branch of the interferometer.
To measure the state, Bob passes the photon through his own interferometer,
adding one of two possible phase shifts, φB , and detects the photon in one of
the two cooled detectors, depending on the choice of both φA and φB . The
room temperature detector looks for a bright pulse from a second laser with
wavelength 1.55 µm, which tells Bob when to expect a photon from Alice. Air
gaps in both interferometers are used for adjustments to keep Alice and Bob
properly synchronized. b) Photo of the Los Alamos experiment. Each signal
originates with Alice’s computer, passes through the 48 km of optical fiber, and
returns to Bob’s computer, just next to Alice’s. (Figure courtesy of Los Alamos
National Labs.)
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Figure 4: The Church of the Larger Hilbert Space. The most general operation
compatible with quantum mechanics, including measurement and generating
random numbers, can be described using three steps. First, augment the system
with an additional system. Second, perform a unitary transformation involv-
ing the original system and the new system. Third, throw away some of the
outputs. This picture applies equally well to a long series of operations, which
can all be pushed into the second step of unitary transformations. This step is
purely quantum, allowing us to delay the complications of measurement until
the end of the evolution. In the figure, the horizontal lines represent the paths
of elementary quantum subsystems, such as two-level quantum bits (“qubits”),
which enter on the left and interact via the unitary transformation U .
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